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Abstract
Wireless LANs are growing rapidly and security has 
always been a concern. We have implemented a hybrid 
system, which will not only detect active attacks like 
identity theft causing denial of service attacks, but will also 
detect the usage of accesspoint discovery tools. The system 
responds in real time by sending out an alert to the 
network administrator. 
1. Introduction 
WIRELESS LANs using the IEEE 802.11 protocols are 
being deployed widely. With this increasing popularity in 
Wi-Fi, security has become a major concern. Until now 
WLANs have encountered threats such as unauthorized 
access to network resources, installation of rogue access 
points and illegal sniffing [1].  We refer to these as 
classical security threats. Today in addition, active and 
advanced attacks like MAC spoofing or Denial of Service 
attacks are more prevalent. Wardriving also pose a major 
security risk. [2].   
1.1. Our Contribution 
We have designed and implemented (DH-ABIDERS), 
which is a combination of Signature and Anomaly based 
Intrusion Detection System (following the classification in 
[3] for wired networks). DH-ABIDERS stands for 
Distributed Hybrid Agent Based Intrusion DEtection and 
Real time Response System.  To summarize, we have 
designed and implemented a system, which uses  
1. Anomaly Based Model to detect identity theft  
2. Signature Based Model to detect wardriving. 
3. LanScan - monitor wireless LAN and to detect 
installation of Rogue Access Points. 
2. Related Work 
AirTraf (Now Elixar) [4], AirDefense [5] are examples 
of software solutions for 802.11 security threats. AirTraf is 
used to discover problems in the WLAN. AirDefense 
provides solutions for intrusion prevention by using an 
anomaly detection system. These tools are not 
comprehensive enough to detect wardriving, identity theft 
and installation of network misconfigurations. There is a 
similar ongoing work being carried out by researchers at 
the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities [6]. Like DH-
ABIDERS, Ajanta uses the “Sequence Number Analysis” 
technique to detect MAC layer spoofing attacks. We unlike 
Ajanta, extend this technique to ICMP augmentation to 
Sequence Number Analysis, for decreasing the number of 
false positives. 
3. Design and Implementation 
3.1.  Architecture 
Consider a cell, which can be thought as an area where 
one WLAN is deployed. Each cell also has a centralized 
agent. This agent is responsible for: 
1. Data collection - Scanning of the cell activity. 
2. First level data analysis. 
3. Updating information with central administrator. 
All these cells come under a central administrator. It is 
responsible for:  
1. Interpreting data passed by cell agents. 
2. Second level data analysis  
3. A response system if intrusion is detected. 
Figure 1 shows agents and the central administrator. 
Figure 1. Cells, Agents, Central Administrator. 
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3.2.  802.11 Attacks 
As shown in Figure 2, we have broadly classified 
wireless attacks as Active and Passive attacks. Installation 
of network misconfigurations like rogue access points 
cannot be classified into passive or active attacks. Identity 
theft (impersonification) attacks are further classified 
according to the techniques used: Packet insertion 
technique and application layer techniques. Passive attacks 
can be classified into illegal sniffing and wardriving. 
Wardriving is discussed in section 3.6.   
Figure 2.  Classification of attacks dealt with. 
3.3. Intrusion Approaches 
Many WLANs today rely on MAC address as an 
authentication entity. While this provides a low level of 
security, there are many security breaches.
Our first approach is based on impersonification of 
MAC address. An attacker can modify the manufacturer 
assigned MAC address of the wireless card on the fly and 
thus the identity of any user.  
A second approach is based on the fact that 802.11 
management frames are neither encrypted nor 
authenticated. Using open source libraries like AirJack or 
Radiate, attackers can inject malicious 802.11 frames in 
the network.  
Libnet [7] is widely used as a packet insertion library for 
wired networks. However it does not provide an interface 
to inject 802.11 frames. Radiate provides 802.11-frame 
creation and injection APIs. They are based on HostAP [8] 
drivers. HostAP is driver for Intersil's Prism2/2.5/3[9] 
chipset wireless LAN cards.  
We used Radiate library for injecting malicious frames 
in the network. After installing and configuring the 
wireless card with HostAP, we wrote a program to 
impersonify the identity of the access point of the network 
and then continuously inject disassociation frames. As an 
effect of this attack, all the other clients connected to the 
access point got continuously kicked off from the network.  
3.4.  Detection Approach 
We use MAC Layer Sequence Number Analysis 
Technique [10] to detect the above-described active 
attacks. We also improve on this to minimize number of 
false positives generated by this technique as described in 
Section 3.5.  The 802.11 standard has set aside 2 bytes for 
sequence control. 802.11 frames have a 12-bit sequence 
number and a 4-bit fragment number in the sequence 
control field. We can use this sequence number to detect 
such attacks. The frame structure of 802.11 is as shown in 
Figure 3. The sequence number is a 12- bit number and is 
generated by the firmware of the NIC card. The sender 
NIC, increments the sequence number, with every frame it 
places on the physical layer. 
Figure 3.  IEEE 802.11 frame structure. 
Consider an attacker spoof his wireless NIC card using 
the techniques described in section 3.3. During this time, 
the legitimate user is unaware of the attackers intentions.  
Thus at any given point during the attack, the DH-
ABIDERS agent will discover 802.11 frames which seem 
to have same MAC address and IP address; the addresses 
of the attacker and the legitimate user; however the order 
of sequence numbers would be notably different. 
Moreover attacker does not have facility to change any 
sequence numbers on the fly because no NIC driver can 
handle sequence number functionality. Reason why NIC 
driver cannot handle this functionality is that, the 
fragmentation of frames is carried out by the NIC 
firmware. Fragments of the same frame need their 
sequence numbers to remain the same. Thus the NIC 
firmware will allocate sequence numbers according to the 
MTU of the physical link and the frame length.  
3.5.  ICMP Augmentation to Sequence Number 
Analysis
Intrusion Detection systems should minimize the 
number of false positives. To reduce these false positives 
generated, we propose an interesting extension called 
“ICMP Augmentation.” It is based on the principle that, 
when an attacker tries to steal the identity of a legitimate 
user, by spoofing his/her MAC address, the attacker will 
certainly obtain the IP address of the legitimate user. Thus 
for a single IP address, there would be two NICs 
responding and thus can conclude malicious spoofing.  
3.6.  Detection of AP Discovery Tools 
Wireless LAN discovery tools such as NetStumbler are 
designed to identify network characteristics. Wardriving 
takes advantage of 802.11 standards being open. The 
802.11 framework has described active probing method, 
which uses probe request frames to detect wireless activity.  
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Our system detects the usage of AP Discovery tools like 
NetStumbler. Upon detecting the use of such a tool, the 
system sends an email to the system administrator and 
saves the packet log as evidence. A unique signature 
pattern of NetStumbler frame as described in [11] is used 
to detect this.   
3.7.  Summing up 
As shown in Figure 4, agent has two modules-The 
sniffing module and the Parsing and Detection module. 
The sniffing module spawns as many agent threads as the 
number of clients, each representing a sniffer for every 
client of the WLAN. 
Figure 4.  Process model of agent in DH-
ABIDERS.
Parsing and Detection module: 
1. Parses the verbose output of the sniffing module 
2. Implements Anomaly based analysis model to detect 
identity theft and DOS attacks.  
3. Implements Signature analysis model to detect 
wardriving.
4. Submits the anomaly-based analysis results to the 
central administrator to perform a second level 
analysis – ICMP Augmentation.  
We have thus developed a Hybrid Real Time Agent 
Based Intrusion Detection and Response System to 
increase the security in wireless networks. The system is 
implemented and tested successfully. The system utilizes 
open source solutions, thus minimizing deployment and 
maintenance costs to a large extent 
Figure 5 shows how the two models are used to detect 
the attacks, classified in Figure 2. 
An interesting extension can be the integration of 
honeypots [12] with DH-ABIDERS. A significant 
improvement, is to integrate the current system with a 
more robust anomaly detection engine, which can analyze 
the captured data for signs of intrusions, using techniques 
such as data mining and statistical approaches for Intrusion 
Detection. Work has been done in [13] related to this. 
Detailed information about this work is available in 
[14]. 
Figure 5.  Models in DH-ABIDERS. 
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